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TARIFF  PREFERENCES  'FOR  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
Claude Trabue 
Chief Executive  Assiet~t to Mr.  DENIAU., 
Member  of the Commission  of the European Communi ties 
Brussels. I  have been asked to address you  on tariff preferences for the developing 
countries,  i.e., the new  tariff machinery that may  in the future govern 
trade relations between the industrialized and the developing  countries~ 
There  has been a. great  deal of talk on  the subject  1  which is worrying to 
certain circles, bu.t  the fact that  discussions have  dragged.  on for the 
last six  .. years is a  consolation to these  same  circles. 
What  is proposed. is that all or the ·great majority of the industrialized 
countries  should. agree to a  unilateral and non-reciprocal cut in customs 
tariffs on  the manufactures and  semi~anufacrures of all the developing 
countries. 
Two  questions  immediately come  to .mind: 
trfuy1  in international trade1  should the principles of reciprocity ~d 
equality on  which the liberal machinery and the international division 
of labour are based be  repudiated? 
How  can a  system :be  found which is acceptable to all when  there are  such 
wide  variations in the  degr~e of underdevelopment  and,  in the case of 
the industrial countries,  not  every sector is equally prosperous? 
I  should like here to try and reply to both these questions and,  after 
fitting the  system  into its general economic  and political context, to 
assess the conditions for its applic.ation. 
In principle, the  system  should be automatic, but in practice it cannot 
be  applied blindly. - 2-
I.  THE  SYSTEM  FORMS  PART  OF  AN  OVERALL  POLITICAL  AND  ECONOMIC  CONTEXT 
Ao  THE  POLITICAL  ASPECT 
1.  It is integrated in a  plan of economic  development  which,  while 
compatible with Western models,  is also adapted to the needs  of the 
developing countries. 
a)  The  industrialized countries of the free world,_  in their own  interests, 
cannot  ignore the problems of the developing countries and must  offer an 
economic  model  that  should not  be interpreted by the Third World as 
crystallizing the  adv~tages acquired by,  and perpetuating the advance 
of, the  developed countries,  but  as  a  tool that can tackle the problems 
of underdevelopment  by offering every country an  equal opportunity to 
achieve economic  growth and well-being. 
b)  For their part, the  developing countries have  tended since the war 
to reject liberalism as a  pattern of development.  On  the one  hand,  it 
was  linked with the memory  of economic  colonization in China and Latin 
America  and of political  coloni~ation in Asia and Africa and,  on  the 
other, it appeared unsuitable because of the existing state of inequality; 
in the words  of Lamennais:  "between weak  and strong,  liberty oppresses". 
Profit consolidated the position of the existing oligarchies and free 
competition prevented the development  of the newcomers.  Hence  the 
natural temptation to turn towards  other economic  models  which the  USSR 
and China had transformed from  utopia into reality. 
The  rejection of economic  liberalism by the newly  independent  nations, 
coupled with their understandable rejection of any rigid solution thrust 
on  them  from  abroad,  leads them  to prefer the techniques of multilateral 
financial aid and to  seek to  expand the number  of their trading partners 
in order to avoid trading exclusively with their former political or 
economic  mother countries. 
2.  This accounts both for the birth of the idea of tariff preferences 
and for its international expansion. 
This  can be broken down  into three  stages:  the support,in principle, first 
of the developing and then of the industrial countries;  the adoption 
of guidelines for the  system;  the  formulation of these principles. 
-·· - 3-
a)  The  idea was  first urged by  some  of the countries of the Third 
World,  partieularly by India, within the framework  of the General 
Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade;,  It took the form  of a  maximum  claim, 
embocying the total exemption  from  customs tariffs of all manufactures 
from  the developing countries, but  received very little consideration, 
as  several industrialized countries,  including some  of the most.important 1 
e.g., the USA,  Switzerland,  Sweden  and Norway,  had clearly expressed 
their opposition in principle to any formula  deviating from  the most-
favoured-nation clause.  Their view  was  that any  generalized system of 
preferences would  be  of limiteq effectiveness and might  en~ger the 
machinery of GATT  and the Kennedy  Round  negotiations. 
Even  those countries that had expressed themselves in favour of the 
principle of introducing new  preferences were  unable to accept the far-
reaching scope  of the proposed system.  Great  Britain advocated a 
generalized and non-discriminatory approach, i.e., extension of the  system 
of Commonwealth  preferences might  ease the competitive pressure exerted on 
its home  market  by exports from  India,  Pakistan and Hong-Kong  while, 
furthermore,  the  disappearance of imperial preferences would facilitate 
its joining the  Common  Market•  The  K~mber States of the Community, 
which had already agreed to apply the French  system  of preferences to 
the  Common  Market  as a  whole,  were in favour of a  system  of preferences 
to benefit the  developing countries,  but  differed as to the methods  to 
be  employedJ  while France,  Italy and BelgiUm  tended to support  the 
idea of selective preferences proposed in the Brasseur Plan1  Germany 
and the Netherlands were  hostile to this graduated approach. 
At  the first  session of the United Nations Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  in 1964,  sustained pressure from  the developing countries 
led to the adoption of a  recommendation for the emergency  examination of 
all aspects of the problem. 
Work  in this direction then begail in UNCTAD,  which  had become  a  permanent 
body,  and in the  OECD1  which  in 1965  set up  a  special group  including 
representatives of the USAJ  Great  Britain, Germany  and France.  In its 
conclusions,  this group  recommended  the granting of generalized preferences 
and outlined a  tentative method  of application.  In this way,  an  important 
step forward was  taken,  largely owing  to the change  in attitude of the 
United States,  whose  President  had spoken in favour  of tariff preferences 
in an official statement to the representatives of the countries of Latin 
America  meeting at  Punta del Este in 1967. 4-
b)  The  second stage began in 1968  at the  second session of the United 
Nations Conference  on  Trade  and Development.  The  New-Delhi  meeting 
provided the opportunity for a  wide  exchange  of views  on  the basis of 
this work  and of the work  of the Group  of 77  and culminated in the 
adoption of a  resolution recognizing that unanimous  agreement  had been 
reached on  the application in the near future of a  mutually acceptable 
and generalized system  of preferences without  reciprocity or discrimination, 
which would benefit the developing countries and  should also assist the least 
developed. 
However,  no  agreement  could be  reached on  the inclusion of processed 
agricultural products in this system,  on its date of application or on 
the idea that UNCTAD  might  be the centre of negotiation on  the relevant 
procedures. 
c) ·  The  third stage,  consisting in the  standardization of proposals, 
began at the OECD  in the  spring of 1969  and should lead to the  submission 
of detailed documents  to UNCTAD  in November. 
The  developed countries will then have to decide  on the details of the 
system and request  GATT  to accept  a·  departure from  the most-favoured-
nation clause  so  that it can be applied. 
From  the political aspect, therefore,  the concept  of generalized 
preferences has reached a  degree of international consensus and contributed 
to improving relations between the developing and the industrialized 
countries.  For the former,  it has confirmed the recognition of unity 
in the Third World  and helped to undo  the impression that  international 
machinery was  pl&nned  only in the interests of the rich,  and for the 
latter, it has  confirmed that the machinery which  led to the progress 
of the industrialized countries in the nineteenth century may,  as a 
result of certain sacrifices, assist the development  of the newcomers. 
At  Bandung,  the have-not nations acted as a  revolutionary party and,  at 
.Algiers,  as a  reformist pressure group. - 5-
B,  FROM  THE  ECONOMIC  ASPECT,  THE  SYSTEM  OF  GEtn!:Rli.LIZED  PREFERENCES 
CAN  BE  DEFINED  AS  A CONSTRUCTIVE  CRITICISM  OF  LIBERALISM;  IT 
CORRECTS  THE  ~UALITIES OF  THE  SYSTEM  AND  WORKS  TOWARDS  LIBERALIZING 
WORLD  TRADE, 
1.  The  now  standard definition of underdevelopment  indicates that 
the handicap of the developing countries is aggravated by the laisser-
faire system that  governs international trade. 
a)  The  situation of the developing countries,  as regards international 
trade, is both marginal  and dependent. 
It is marginal,  because their position in international trade is weak 
and continuing to weaken: 
Between  1960  and 1967,  the value  of international exports rose from 
127,000  to 214;000  million dollars, that of the  developing countries 
from  28,000  to 42,500  million dollars.  During these  seven years,  the 
exports of the industrialized countries increased by  81%  and those of 
the  developing countries by only 47%. 
The  developing countries'  exports accounted for  19%  of the world total, 
as  compared with  22%  seven years earlier. 
Their trade was  mainly with the industrialized countries:  73%  of the 
developing countries•  exports went  to industrialized countries and only 
2o%  towards other developing countries.  Trade  with the industrialized 
countries is therefore vital to the developing countries,  while it is 
only of relatively minor  importance to the former. 
It is dependent,  since the  developing countries are affected by both 
the instability and their inadequacy of their export  revenue: 
Most  of the developing countries obtain their foreign earnings from  a 
limited number  of products, the prices of which fluctuate fairly widely 
on  the international market.  Therefore these fluctuations  influence 
the internal situation even more,  since that part of the population 
whose  living is governed by the  m~ket economy  cannot  find a  compensatory 
outlet within the  coUntry  and is thus more  dependent  on  international 
conditions;  consequently,  incomes,  private savings and investments 
fluctuate to a  considerable degree.  The  same  is true of public savings, 
especially since the taxation revenue of the developing countries is 
generally derived m~qh_less from  income  tax and more  from  indirect  sources. .;..  6-
The  range of variation complicates every attempt  at medium-term  develop-
ment.  Sociologists add that neither the savings habit nor the will for 
this instability of income  encourages industrialization, but intensifies 
fatalism  among  the poorer classes and stimulates the taste for speculation 
among  the rich. 
In other words,  while  some  industrialized countries try to stabilize 
their internal situation by regulating their foreign trade,  fluctuations 
in the world markets tend to have  an even greater effect in the developing 
countries. 
Moreover,  revenue  from  eJ."'Ports  tends to  expand less rapidly than expenditure 
on  imports.  A rough statistical examination shows  that inequality in  the 
balance of trade is a  long-term phenomenon,  as the terms of trade between 
the developing and industrialized countries are tending to deteriorate: 
the volume  of the developing countries'  exports is growing more  rapidly 
than that of their imports,  but  the unit value of these  exports is falling 
faster.  This statistical approach can be accepted only if it is regarded 
merely as an observation and a  forecast,  and not  as an explanation. 
b)  The  instability and inadequacy of export  revenue will continue as 
long as there is no  change  in the structure of the developing countries. 
Admittedly,  this situation has direct  causes,  e.g., the artifical 
conditions often prevailing on  the international market,  as in the  case 
of agriculture,  where  surpluses are frequently offered at  abnormally low 
prices,  moreover,  market  conditions are often falsified because  of the 
existence of monopolies. 
However,  the fundamental  cause is bound up  with the low  degree  of 
diversification in the economic  structure of the developing countries, 
which produce and sell mainly commodities  and,  in addition,  generally 
concentrate on the production of a  small number  of them.  At  the  same 
time,  except in the case of petroleum,  the quantities that  can be 
absorbed by  the international market  are increasing only gradually and 
there is a  relative fall in prices.  The  causes of this are many  and 
persistant,  as they are essentially linked up  with technical progress 
which facilitates savings in the use  of commodities,  the development  of 
synthetic substitutes and an increase in agricultural output. 
Between  1960  and 1967,  exports of food products,  commodities  and fuels 
rose from  23,000 to  31,500 million dollars, i.e.,  3o%  in seven years. - 7-
Excluding fuels,  the monetary value of sales during that period increased 
by only 17%. 
These  products still make  up  .8o%  of exports from  the developing oountries1 
while they account  for only  26%  of the exports of the industrialized 
countries. 
Except  in the case of fuels,  the developing countries do  not  dominate 
the world market  for these commodities.  Between  1960  and 1967,  their 
food  exports fell from  36  to  31%  and their exports of commodities  from 
35  to  3o%.J  on  the other hand,  their fuel sales on  the world market 
increased from  60  to 64%. 
The  developing countries sell only a  very limited quantity of manufactured 
products.  Their exports amount  to only 81500  million dollars, i.eo, 
6%  of world exports,  but  everi  so are expanding three times as quickly as 
their exports .of  commo~ties. 
c)  Market  machinery,  neutral in theory,  in practice therefore has 
harmful  effects on  the groWth  policies of the developing countries. 
The  granting of generalized preferences for manufactured products may 
thus be  one  of the compensatory mechanisms  which will balance the uneven 
effects of liberalism on  countries at  different  stages of development. 
The  effect of the  system is diff:i,cult to measure  since it depends,  on 
one  hand  on  the  scope  of the preferences and the degree  of competitiveness 
of the developing countries and,  ·on  the other,  on  unforeseeable economic 
factors:  the amount  of a  preference.can be.used by the exporter to 
increase his income  per unit produced,  to lower his prices and expand his 
market,  or it may  be  confiscated by the importer..  . The  facilities offered 
to the developing countries should enable them,  over the  short term,  to 
obtain increased and more  stable export  revenue  and,  in the long term, 
if the preferences are granted for  a  sufficient length of time,  to 
promote their industrialization either because  the additional revenue 
may  encourage  self-financing or because the increased prospects of 
profitability attract foreign investments. 
The  granting of generalized preferences is.not the only way  to restore 
the balance:  the machinery for stabilizing commodities  and agricultural 
products is designed to restrict market  fluctuations,  while the aim  of 
financial  aid is to offset partly the inadequate amounts  of savings and 
foreign exchange  available.  The  lack of progress in the field of -8-
international agreements and the  decline of aid'render the efforts made 
towards a  system  of preferences all the more  valuable. 
English expression:  "Trade,  not  aid". 
To  use  an 
The  use of these three correcting mechanisms  is not new.  What  is new 
is the idea of using them  not  merely on the national or regional levels 
but  on  a  world-wide  scale,  and this more  rational approach should in 
theory enable a  better balance to be  struck between advantages  and costA. 
It remains to be  seen whether this machinery will not' be more  fragile 
than that which  existed in the preferential zones  of the past  and whether 
the intangible solidarity it creates will be  as generous.  It is this 
dual  question which  has  led the six Common  Market  countries, at the same 
time  as they are proposing a  world  system of generalized preferences,  to 
renew their association with the  EAMA. 
2.  In addition to correcting uneven effects of liberalism,  a  system of 
generalized preferences may  also promote the liberalization of world 
trade and a  return to normal market  rules. 
a)  It is a  factor in liberalizing international trade. 
This is evident,  although it may  at the outset  give rise to  some  doubt. 
The  feat  has been expressed that these preferences, if they were  constant 
in relation to the general  system,  might  hinder any reciprocal cut  in 
tariffs to which the industrialized countries might  agree.  That  is why 
the latter have  always asserted,that preferences  should not  be  negotiated 
but  given unilaterally,  and that they might  decrease in the  case  of a 
multilateral cut  in tariffs. 
Preferences  should have  three effects on international trade: 
an increase in trade between the industrialized and  developing 
countries;  as the  exports and foreign exchange  earnings of the 
developing countries improved,  they could increase their imports; 
- an increased degree  of multilateral exchanges,  since  such exchanges 
would be  less influenced by the former north-south preferential zonesJ 
- an encouragement  to the developed countries to show  greater respect 
for the international division of labour by  going on  to the  second 
technological era and gradually abandoning the first to the  developing 
countries. ·.:..  9 
b)  It is also a  factor which may  encourage the developing countries 
wishing to benefit  from  the  system to have  greater recourse to a  market 
economy.  Experience has  shown  that the production of the  developing 
countries,  which,  in their desire to protect their economic  independence~ 
have adopted ·a  policy of excessive isolationism and rigid planning, has 
often been less competitive and expanded less rapidly than that of the 
countries which have  restricted themselves to adjusting their market 
machinery. 
There are many  examples  of this: 
The  ban on  importing luxury products leads to the on-the-spot  development 
of luxury industries;  rates of interest are too  low  for the  establishment 
of heavily capitalized industries;  excessive protection of domestic 
markets hampers  any  export policy since the undertaking compelled to 
buy its supplies locally pays for them  at a  rate which renders the 
finished product  quite uncompetitive. 
Too  many  administrative controls lead to an increase in costs either 
because the undertaking has to transfer from  the productions process too 
large a  proportion. of its resources,  or because it has to carry excessive 
stocks to guard against the delay in the issuing of import  licences,  or 
even  because it makes  useless investments to justify the granting of 
additional licences.  Examples  of this can be  found in India,  Argentina 
and Brazil,  where  the time required to obtain an import  licence is over 
six months.  As  a  result, plant is frequently used at very low  capacity, 
e.g.,  47%  on  average in Argentina and  28%  for  some  sectors of the Indian 
economy,  while in the United States it is in the neighbourhood of 84% 
and in Europe  over 9Cf/o. 
On  the other hand,  in countries like Taiwan,  Pakistan and Hong  Kong, 
which have  carried out  a  far more  liberal policy as regards imports,  the 
utilization rates are comparable to  th~se in Europe  and  such countries 
have  succeeded in increasing their plant and exports at  a  very fast  pace. 
The  concept  of preferences thus leads to the convergence of several 
currents of political thought: 
economic  liberalism with a  more  modern  approach to underdevelopment, 
the political solidarity of the Third World,  as claimed by the latter 
and acknowledged by  the rich countries; ...  10-
a  general  acceptance of the fact  that international problems arc 
interdependent. 
From  the foregoing,  the keywords  of the  system are derived,  i.e., 
preference,  generalized,  automatic,  non-discriminatory.  It is based on 
an overall economic  analysis of underdevelopment;  this constitutes both 
the strength and the weakness  of the  systems  which  become  apparent  when 
an attempt is made  to put  these ideas into actual practice. 
II.  AUTOMATIC  IN  PRINCIPLE,  THE  SYSTEM  OF  PREFERENCES  MUST  NOT  BE 
APPLIED  BLINDLY;  IT  SHOULD  BE  ACCEPTABLE  TO  ALL  AND  SHOULD  NOT 
CAUSE  SERIOUS  ECONOMIC  UPSETS. 
A.  It should be  acceptable both to the developing and to the developed 
countries, i.e., it should  offer~ satisfactory solution to the problem 
both of equal treatment for the developing countries and of equal burdens 
for industrialized countries. 
1.  A system based on  free  competition raises the problem for the 
developing countries of the unequal  degree of development  referred to in 
the  survey of relations between them  and the developed countries. 
a)  The  relative degree  of advancement  of  some  countries should not  cause 
them  to suffer from  the  system if they are excluded,  or to monopolize it 
if'th€y benefit  from  it. 
There  are several degrees of underdevelopment: 
in some  countries economic  development  has  alrea~ begun,  while in 
others this is not yet the casef 
some  are still producers of commodities  and in others the industrial-
ization process has  started; 
some  possess only primary processing industries and others more 
a.dvanced  forms; 
- there are  some  whose  industry is not  competitive and is concentrated 
on the domestic market  and others whose  industry is alrea~ competitive 
on  the international market. 
Their uneven  development  is reflected in the participation of the  developing 
countries in world trade in manufactures and scmi-momufaotures.  Half the 
imports  of the  OECD  member  countries from  the developing countries come 
from  five of them  and two-thirds from  ten of them.  The  same  is true -ll-
for the  Common  Market,  where  eight countries alone account  for  5o%  of 
the exports  t~ the Community  from  the  develop~'countries. 
The  developing countries themselves are aware  of this situation.  Both 
at the Algiers and the New  Delhi. conferences they stressed the need for 
special measures to help the least  develop~d countries,  but  did not 
define what  they should be. 
Allowing the most  advanced of the developing countries to benefit  from 
the preforonooa  system raises a  problem for the least  developed.  The 
exclusion of some  countries raises another.  Thus,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece  and Turkey have  si;ated that they cannot  be treated in a  discriminatory 
way  as compared with other countries at an intermediate  stage of economic 
development  and have .requested that they be  granted prcforcnoos  also. 
b)  The  system proposed to UNC~AD by the Community  and the OECD  is in 
principle one  of  self~election, linked with a  corrective mechanism. 
After considering the various criteria of underdevelopment,  the OECD 
Special Group  concluded that it was  impossible to define a  method  of 
selection based on  criteria which  were  both objective and politically 
acoeptable. 
As  a  result, there are only three possible  solutions:  the choice of 
beneficiaries can be  made  by  the countries providing the aid,  by the 
countries whose  classification among  the less developed is without  any 
doubt,  or on  the principle of self-election. 
The  first  solution would not  have  been welcomed  by the developing 
countries. 
The  second would  mean  leaving the decision to the Group  of 77.  This 
club of developing countries embraces  the countries of South and Central 
America,  including Cuba,  the non-Communist  countries of Asia,  excluding 
Hong  Kong,  the Middle  Eastern countries,  excluding Turkey and Israel, 
the countries of Africa,  excluding South Africa,  and Yugoslavia and 
possibly Rumania  in Europe.  The  fear has been expressed that  t  for 
political considerations,  the Group  might  tend to  draw  up as  short  a 
list as possible. 
Only  the third solution then remains,  namely,  the principle of self-
election which,  nevertheless,  has built-in corrective machinery. 
A political corrective:  donor  countries have  agreed that,  for imperative 
reasons that are not  economic,  they may  exclude certain countries from - 12-
preferences, e.g., this makes  it possible for the USA  to refuse 
preferences to Cuba.  However,  in principle,  a  country cannot,  by the 
terms of the New  Delhi resolution,  be  excluded for reasons of competition; 
the strict application of this principle would  tend to reduce the list 
of products to which preferences can be applied. 
A dual  economic  corrective:  in order to restrict the quotas of the more 
competitive developing countries and to reserve a  substantial quota 
for the less competitive,  the Community  has proposed. that preferential 
imports from  any one  country may  not  exceed 5o%  of the preferential 
ceiling fixed for  each product.  Further,  countries  alrea~ benefiting 
from  regional preferences will continue to  enjoy relative residual 
preferences in relation to the other developing countries. 
For the moment,  therefore,  the problem has been dealt  with by adopting 
a  solution based on political rather than economic  considerations. 
2.  A fair distribution of burdens is necessary for the industrialized 
countries. 
a)  It will be far easier for an industrialized country to agree to 
make  a  considerable effort at "tariff disarmament" if it is not the only 
one  seeking an improved international organization.  A ~ternment can 
only get the people of its country to accept  a  reduction of customs 
tariffs if it can explain the economic  advantages  obtained in exchange; 
this is the principle on  which  GATT  negotiations are based.  However, 
any justification of a  non-reciprocal dismantling of customs  duties can 
be  based only on  the argument  that other countries are making  a  similar 
effort in an international context to help the developing countries to 
improve their export  revenue  and to promote their development. 
If a  similar effort is not made  by the other prosperous countries, 
- the  sensitive sectors of the  economy  would find it hard to understand 
why  they ahould be  placed in a  more  difficult  situation than their 
competitors in other ?ich countries; 
it would also be  difficult to gain accoptance·for the idea that 
foreign investors in the developing countries have  easier access to 
national markets if domestic  investors in developing countries did 
not  receive a  similar advantage in foreign countries, - 13-
- moreover,  if any  one  sector is in difficulties, there would be  a  great 
temptation to revoke preference measures rather than increase protection 
against other industrialized countries,  since  sUCh  protection has to 
be  compensated in GATT.  These  sectoral difficulties might  in addition 
become  more  frequent  since the impact  of the competition from  the 
developing countries would be  concentrated on a  single country and 
the differences in the economic  situations of the industrialized countries 
would render it impossible to counter these external pressures. 
For the developing countries themselves,  the possibilities of additional 
exports are all the wider and the risk of disorganizing markets all the 
more  reduced if there are more  donor  countries.  Developing countries 
already receiving tariff preferences will find it all the more  difficult 
to give them  up  if they do  not  receive ·in return easier access to the 
markets  of other industrialized countries. 
b)  Tho  granting of preferences by all the developing countries may 
certainly involve  exceptions and marginal adjustments. 
This is the proqlem  of those .OECD  countries which,  although they have 
a  diversified economy,  have not yet  reached a  level of development 
comp~~able to that of the major industrialized countries. 
This problem  faces the Eastern countries.  Since  customs  duties have  only 
a  limited influence on their external  tra~e, they must  seek to increase 
their purchases from  the developing countries by other means  than that 
of tariff preferences. 
B.  The  system  should not·  cause  economic  upsets. 
The  desire of the  developing com1tries for as favourable  a  system as 
possible confronts the industrialized countries with the problem of 
knowing whether,  in certain sensitive sectors, the maintenance of some 
degree of protection with regard to the developing countries is not 
necessary§  in other words,  what  products  should the list include and 
what  should be the amount  of the tariff advantages granted? 
1.  List of products concerned 
As  agricultural and mineral commodities must  be  evaluated differently, 
two  questions arise:  Can  processed agricultural products be  included 
in the list?  Must  certain sensitive industrial products be  excluded? - 14-
a)  Broadly speaking,· processed agricultural products are also manufactures 
or semi-manufactures.  They  make  up  15%  of the exports of processed goods 
from  the  developing countries;  the agricultural and food sectors of even 
the most  advanced of them  account  for a  considerable proportion of their 
industry. 
In spite of the persistence of the developing countries,  the \riestern 
countries have  taken the view that the granting of preferences can only 
be  considered case by case  since the protection of agriculture generally 
includes the food industry and it is difficult to distinguish one  from  the 
other. 
Considering the matter on  a  case-by case basis,  the  Community  was  prompted 
to make  a  distinction between  competitive products from  temperate countries; 
in which  case any possible  rel~ation of protection could only  co~r the 
processing industries,  and tropical products,  for which  wider preferences 
could be  contemplated on  condition that they did not  disturb the trade 
relations already established with developing countries enjoying the 
benefit  of regional preference contracts.  Therefore,  the  Community  has 
made  restricted offers:  for very sensitive products,  reduction of 
industrial protection by half (5%  of products);  for sensitive products, 
reduction by  a  quarter  (3o%  of products). 
b)  For industrial products, the approach adopted is the converse  of that 
decided on  for agricultural products:  in principle, all industrial 
products will benefit from  the preferential system,  although there may 
be  exceptions in sectors in which the  developing countries arc  alrea~ 
competitive. 
These  exceptions must  not  become  too generalized and  spread from  sector 
to sector or country to country.  Three principles should be  observed: 
- the maintenance of protective tariffs may  be  found to be  superfluous 
if other protective machinery,  quota restrictions or international 
arrangements  exist; 
donor  countries should cooperate in drawing up  the list of exceptions, 
since the abolition of protection is more  easily acceptable to all 
parties if each knows  that the impact  of competition will be  distributed 
among  them  all; 
- exceptions  should apply only to cases in which the removal  of protection 
will inevitably cause  serious and immediate harm  to the products 15  -
conoernedf  if there is merely a  slight risk,  a  minor alleviation of 
protection and a  safeguard clause are sufficient. 
The  Community  has  excluded no  product  from  its preference system.  All 
its calculations are based on  the assumption that Hong  Kong  will not 
benefit  from  preferences under  common  lawJ  it took the view that 
preferences might  be  extended to all sensitive products if they were 
subjected to a quota ceiling. 
For certain particularly sensitive products  on  which international or 
bilateral agreements exist  (textiles,  cotton,  jute,  coir), preferences 
will apply only to signatories of these agreements  with the dual limitation 
of a  quota and a  minimum  price, 
2.  llmoU:nt  of tariff reductions 
.Any  liberalization measure  agreed to cannot  be total, unconditional 
and final,  as its real effect  on the additional volume  of imports and on 
prices cannot  be forecast. 
The  risk to the industrialized countries must  not  be overestimated.  They 
have been able to withstand the effects of the tariff reductions agreed 
to in GATT  or those resulting from  the establishment  of a  customs union 
or a  free trade area,  and it' would  be  unreasonable for them  to be more 
·concerned about  competition from  the developing countries than about 
that which they accept  from  other industrialized co.untries. 
shown  in theory and observed in practice. 
This  can be 
A substantial increase in the  .. imports of manufactures from  the developing 
countries would have  a  negligible overall effect on  the industrialized 
countries,  since they account  for only: a  small part  of the latter's 
trade.  The  only effects to be  considered would be those on  certain 
regions or certain industries.  l~ OECD  report  concludes that if exports 
from  the developing countries to the  OECD  coU11tries  increased by  1 1000 
million dollars annually, i.e., at twice the  existing rate, the fall in 
employment  in the most  sensitive sectors of Europe  and the USA  would 
be  0.7%  per annum  in the case of textiles and shoes,  1%  in that of 
clothing and  zfo  in that  of hides and skins.  By  way  of comparison it 
should be  remembered that  every year,  depending on  the sectors,  8-25% 
of the workers in the  US  change  jobs. i6 
In practice, the Australian example  of granting preferential quotas to 
the developing countries  shows  that these quotas were  only used up  to 
13%  at the outset  and to  23jh  novT. 
Taking exaggerated precautions would ultimately lead to a  consolidation 
of the  de  facto  situation with legal provisions,  whereby the developing 
countries would remain  on  the fringe of world trade.  The  danger 
exists that the desire for a  general, multilateral system vdll,  through 
inability to assess its scope!  result in an ineluctable multiplication 
of safeguard measures. 
Protection techniques are many  and varied.  At  the moment,  the 
industrialized countries have  anti-dumping regulations,  maintain quotas 
for  some  countries and,  in the case of sectoral or regional upsets,  can 
always take  exceptional measures.  Tariff preferences can also be 
accompanied by three types of restrictions: 
The  first is the  degree to which the tariff is lowered,  whether the article 
can be  imported free  of duty or whether a  partial reduction is applied. 
Some  countries have  chosen the  second formula to avoid the exclusion of 
certain products.  For reasons  of simplicity, the Community  has opted for 
the free entry of industrial products and for a  part-reduction in the 
case of processed agricultural products. 
The  second restriction, that of volume,  may  talce  the form  of a  safeguard 
clause or the fixing of tariff quotas beyond which the ordinary customs 
duties are applied. 
The  first formula has the merit  of clarity and the disadvantage of fixing 
a  limit.  The  safeguard clause places no  restriction on  exports unless 
difficulties arise.  However,  its application gives rise to complex 
problems: 
-How can improper withdrawals,  which would have  a  chain-reaction effect 
on  other industrialized countries,  be  avoided? 
- How  can exports from  one  industrialized country to another be  maintained 
if the former loses its market  to a  developing country? 
-Would the withdrawal  of advantages apply only to a  country causing ru1 
upset  or to all the developing countries? 
The  Community  has  chosen the first  solution for processed agricultural 
products and a  system  of preferential tariff quotas for all industrial 
products.  These  quotas may  be  exceeded in the  case of some  products if ~ 17 
their importation does  not  harm·the market.  Calculated on the basis 
of imports from  the developing countries, they would be  inorea~ed annually 
by a  fraction of the increase in the volume  of total imports  from the 
developed countries. 
Thirdly,  there is the time limit.  A period of ten years has been 
decided upon,  without  prejudice to a  subsequent  review of the  system. 
This time limit considerably restricts the  scope  of preferences.  It 
~llows for  an increase in production through the fuller use  of existing 
equipment,  but it is too  short to provide a  sufficient  stimulus for new 
investments.  Ten  years now  seems  too. short  a  period for the head of an 
undertaking to plan,  equip  ~d  pay off the cost of a  new  factory.  It 
merely ensures an additional market  for the immediate  future  ~nd eventually 
has no  effect at all.  If the time limit allowed is intended to provide 
u  stimulus, it would have  to be  longer or run from  the time at which  an 
industry is established.  Even· if these conditions were  to be fulfilled, 
investors would be  running a  risk,  since the relevant preferences could 
disappear if the industrialized countries  decided multilaterally in GATT 
to lower their tariffs. 
In conclusiont  two  questions must  be answered;  How  is the  system to be 
judged?  When  will it come  into force? 
A.  How  is the system to be  judged? 
Three  conclusions  can be reached: 
1.  In principle, the introduction into international trade of  asym~etrical 
rules to assist the developing countries is a  move  along the road towards 
industrialization and helps to improve  the international distribution of 
labour.  Not  only does it not  contradiqt  liberal doctrine but,  rather, 
strengthens it: 
As  a  result, it h~s a  considerable political influence on  the  develoP-
ing countries. 
This is· particularly·  important· since the volume  of aid is declining 
and commodity  market  organization is making very little progress. 
2.  The  universal· and  automatic nature of the  system  complicates its 
application and restrict its scope: 
- The  effective  scope  of the  system is of necessity limited and complicated 
by all the restrictions - quotas,  safeguards,  time limits - to which - 18 
it is subjected,  so  that any  danger of upsetting the  economy  of the 
industrialized countries is avoided. 
- The  system will benefit mainly those countries in which industrialization 
and economic  development  have  begun and will help existing industries, 
which will be  enabled to work  to full capacity.  The  importance  of 
this effect is considerable in view of the foreseeable difficulties 
that may  face the developing countr'ies in maintaining their trade 
balances.  However,  in view of the proposed time limits, the  system will make 
only  o. minor contribution to the industrialization of the  developing 
countries. 
3.  The  dissociation of the various aid techniques may  weaken  the 
effectiveness of each of these mechanisms. 
It would have  been possible to conceive a  different method· using these 
techniques in conjunction.  Every time that an investment  in a  develoP-
ing country benefits from  bilateral or multilateral aid,  the bordering 
countries and the countries giving aid undertake to grant,  for a  period 
of 10 years,  a  tariff quota totally exempt  from  duty representing a 
given fraction of the production capacity.  Thus,  during the preliminary 
years of exploring possibilities and of amc:rtization,  industry has an 
additional  outlet to stimulate its early development.  Such  a  system  could 
operate without  any  safeguard clause,  would  promote the establishment  of 
new  industries suited to regional needs  and could be used flexibly. 
As  matters now  stand, it is extremely difficult to give up  the principle 
of universality and non-discrimination.  The  developing countries will 
have  to discover this and recognize that, in point  of fact,  a  non-
discriminatory system will benefit  more  particularly those countries in 
which  economic  development  has already begun.  If there is no  direct 
selection,  one is generally constrained to work  backwards. 
B.  When  will the  system  come  into force? 
The  necessity for the developed countries to reach agreement  among 
themselves  explains why  the progress made  in drawing up  the  system is so 
slow. 
The  intention is not that  avery country should agree to lower its duties 
on  the same  products to the  same  extent  or to apply the  same  safeguards. 
This would certainly make  the system  simpler,  but it would unquestionalby 
limit its scope  and the fair distribution of costs would not  be  better - 19  -
guaranteed in view of differences in economic  situation.  What  is 
necessary is to reach agreement  on  a  principle and a  method. 
With  regard to principles, the attitude of the United States up  to the 
immediate  past has reflected some  degree  of hesitation. 
After having stated its inability to respect the  OECD  time  limits as a 
consequence  of the review of its entire trade policy and after having 
limited itself to submitting illustrative lists together with long lists 
of products to be  excepted,  with exceptions for countries whose  exports 
exceed lo%  of the total USA  imports,  President Nixon  last week  reiterated 
his support  for generalized preferences.  The  Community's  decision to 
submit its offers to UNCTAD  at all events on  the promised date perhaps 
contributed to this decision. 
Yesterday,  the representative of the  US  Government  submitted to OECD  on 
behalf of his Government  and subject to Congress  approval a  new  plan: 
the fair distribution of burdens,  duty-free entry for all manufactures 
with the exception of three sectors,  including processed petroleum products, 
a  safeguard clause and the application of the  system to all countries 
deriving no  benefit  from  preferential systems nor granting reciprocal 
preferences. 
The  range  of clauses covered in the proposals put  forward by various 
countries make  the conclusion of a  rapid agreement  doubtful:  equivalent 
effort clause  (Great  Britain,  the Nordic  oountries1  USA),  the disappearance 
of existing preferential systems and the disappearance  of reverse prefer-
ences  (Switzerland,  Nordic  countries, USA). 
For its part, the European  Community,  aware  of its international 
responsibilities in relation to external trade and desirous of reaching 
concrete results, will do  all in its power  to contribute to the solution 
of this problem  in a  way  that will alleviate the trade difficulties of 
the developing countries. 